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 Introduction 
  During the 1990s, international organizations such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the World Bank encouraged both developed and developing economies to 
restructure their economies in the image of the United States. These proponents of 
loosely regulated US-style labor, product, and financial markets justified their support for 
the "US model" by pointing to the country's low unemployment rate, rapid economic and 
productivity growth, and prodigious capacity for wealth accumulation, especially in 
national stock markets. These same advocates, however, frequently exaggerated US 
performance relative to other advanced economies (Schmitt and Mishel, 2000) and 
glossed over the high and rising level of economic and social inequality in the United 
States. 
  This paper seeks to describe the scale and growth of economic inequality in the 
United States since the end of the 1970s, and, then, to analyze some of the economic and 
political forces that account for these developments. The first section of the chapter 
reviews recent trends in three of the most important economic distributions: wages, 
incomes, and wealth.
1 The second section of the chapter describes the set of interlocking 
forces that have, since the end of the 1970s, driven the rise in economic and social 
inequality. While these forces take many disparate forms –a fall in unionization rates, a 
decline in the legislated minimum wage, erosion of the generosity of the social safety net, 
deregulation of product and financial markets, privatization of many state and local 
                                                 
1 A complete analysis of economic hardship associated with the "US model" would also require an 
examination of the rise in hours of work, high and generally rising levels of job instability and job 
insecurity, the deterioration of the social safety net, and other developments. Coverage of all these topics, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive review of the US labor market in the 
1980s and 1990s, including many of topics not covered here, see Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005); 
for a detailed analysis of job quality, see Schmitt (2001). 
  2government functions, and others– they have a common denominator: each shifts the 
balance of power away from workers and toward their employers. Ultimately, these 
policy shifts, which reflect the balance of power in society at large, and not technological 
progress or even the increasing pace of globalization, are the primary culprits behind the 
widening economic and social disparities documented here. 
Three Important Economic Distributions 
  At the end of the 1970s, the United States was probably the most economically 
unequal of the advanced capitalist economies, and, since the end of the 1970s, economic 
inequality has almost certainly increased more in the United States than it has in the rest 
of the world's rich countries.
2 This section reviews recent developments in three of the 
most important economic distributions: hourly wages, annual incomes, and net wealth. 
While a complete analysis of economic and social inequality would require a thorough 
discussion of the distribution of access to medical care, adequate housing, quality 
education, and other fundamental aspects of well-being, the wage, income, and wealth 
distributions nevertheless provide a compelling, if somewhat incomplete, picture of 
economic and social inequality in the United States at the turn of the century. 
  Wages 
  The first distribution of interest is hourly wages –what workers earn (before 
paying taxes) for an hour of their work. Table 1 summarizes several important aspects of 
this distribution for the United States in 2004. The first striking feature of the distribution 
of wages is that it is highly unequal. As the table shows, the median (50th percentile) 
worker made $14.00 per hour in 2004 –about twice the rate ($6.80) for a low-wage (10th 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2 For an analysis of wage-inequality trends in the OECD countries, see Glyn (2001). For a discussion of 
income inequality trends, see Burniaux, Dang, Fore, Förster, d'Ercole, and Oxley (1998), Annex 3, and 
Smeeding (2002). 
  3percentile) worker, and about half the rate ($30.46) for a high-wage (90th percentile) 
worker. A second feature of the wage distribution is that inequality is especially high at 
the top. Very high-wage workers, such as those in the 95th percentile ($37.34) received 
about 23% more per hour than high-wage workers in the 90th percentile, who were only 
five-percentage points lower in the distribution. A third characteristic of the wage 
distribution is that men at any given point in the male wage distribution earn substantially 
more than women do at the corresponding point in their own distribution. In 2004, low-
wage (10th percentile) women workers, for example, made about 7% less than their male 
counterparts, while women at the 50th, 90th, and 95th percentiles earned 16-20% less 
than men in the same position in the male distribution. A final salient aspect of the wage 
distribution is that wages differ sharply across racial and ethnic lines. In 2004, the median 
(50th percentile) white male worker ($17.26) earned 56% more than the median Hispanic 
male worker ($11.09) and 34% more than the median black male worker ($12.91). At the 
median, white women ($13.11) received about 13% more than black women ($11.65) and 
about 35% more than Hispanic women ($9.71). 
  The inequality visible in the wage data for 2004 is the result of long-standing 
historical processes including gender and racial discrimination. Since the end of the 
1970s, however, these historical forces have been particularly effective in raising wage 
inequality. Figure 1 graphs changes between 1973 and 2004 in the inflation-adjusted 
value of wages at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the overall wage distribution. In 
the figure, all wages were set equal to 100.0 in real terms in 1979. Between 1979 and 
1985, the real value of the 10th percentile wage fell about 15%. Over the same period, 
real wages at the 50th percentile remained roughly constant, while wages at the 90th 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
  4percentile rose about 10%. As a result, wage inequality, measured as the gap between 
workers in the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile, grew sharply. Between the mid-
1980s and the mid-1990s, wage inequality continued to grow, primarily because wages at 
the bottom and the middle stagnated at the same time that wages at the top continued to 
grow at a modest pace. From the mid-1990s through 2001, however, wages rose quickly 
for workers at all wage levels. Wages grew fastest at the top and bottom, keeping the 
level of inequality as measured by the differential between the 90th and 10th percentiles 
roughly constant. Wages grew slightly slower at the median, contributing to a narrowing 
of the 50th-10th differential and a slight rise in the 90th-50th differential. 
  Even after strong wage gains in the late 1990s for low- and middle-wage workers, 
the wage distribution was still substantially more unequal at the turn of the century than it 
had been twenty years earlier. Wage growth over the 1980s and 1990s –in both real terms 
and relative to average productivity– was also well below rates achieved in the earlier 
postwar period. Real wages for 10th percentile workers, for example, were no higher in 
2004 than they had been in 1979, despite a 66% increase over the same period in the 
average output per hour worked (productivity).
3 At the median, real wages rose only 13% 
between 1979 and 2004, an average of less than 0.5% per year. Even at the 90th 
percentile, real wage gains over the same period of 25% trailed far behind productivity 
growth. 
  The wage data in Figure 1 refer to all workers and mask substantial differences in 
the underlying developments for men and women, which appear separately in Figures 2 
and 3. Both the male and female distributions show large increases in inequality, but the 
                                                 
3 Growth between 1979 and 2004 in average non-farm business output per hour from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics web page (www.bls.gov), series: PRS85006093. 
 
  5graphs reveal two key differences. First, the rise in inequality after 1979 (measured by the 
90-10 differential), was larger for women than it was for men. Between 1979 and 2004, 
the 90-10 ratio for men grew from 3.9 to 4.6, while the corresponding ratio for women 
increased from 2.6 to 4.1. Second, across the entire distribution, real wages grew faster 
(or declined more slowly) for women than they did for men. Between 1979 and 2004, at 
the 90th percentile, for example, real wages grew about 50% for women and only about 
18% for men; at the 50th percentile, women's real wages increased about 24%, compared 
to about a 3% decline for men; and, at the 10th percentile, wages for women were down 
almost 4% compared to no change for men.
4 (As we saw above, even though women's 
wages grew more rapidly at all points across the distribution, by 2004, women's wages 
remained below men's wages at comparable points in the two distributions.) 
  Wages are the most important, but not the only, form of compensation paid to 
workers. In a country that does not provide low-cost, universal, medical care and where 
the Social Security system, while efficient and effective, is designed only to keep the 
elderly out of poverty, employer-provided health and pension benefits are two forms of 
non-wage compensation that are particularly important determinants of workers' well-
being.
5 Table 2 presents data on the coverage rates for employer-provided health and 
pension plans from 1979 through 2002. In 2002, a substantial share of US workers did 
not have employer-provided health or pension coverage: only 57.3% of workers were 
                                                 
4 For a detailed breakdown of real-wage trends for all, male, and female workers, see Mishel, Bernstein, 
and Allegretto (2005), Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. For a detailed comparison of male and female wage 
inequality, see their Table 2.16. 
 
5 Other important forms of non-wage compensation are paid vacations and holidays, paid family or medical 
leave, child-care, and severance pay. Unlike the European Union, which requires employers to provide 
minimum (and, by US standards, generous) levels of paid leave, the United States does not have statutory 
requirements for paid leave. US labor law does require employers with more than 50 employees to provide 
unpaid leave of up to 12 weeks for family and medical reasons. US employers are not required to, and 
generally do not provide, child-care benefits or severance pay. 
 
  6enrolled in employer-provided health plans and only 45.5% were in employer-sponsored 
pension plans. Moreover, participation in such plans varied substantially across wage 
level, gender, and race. Among workers in the bottom fifth of the wage distribution, just 
26.6% had health coverage, compared to 78.5% for the top fifth of workers. Men (61.1%) 
were more likely than women (52.8%) to have health insurance benefits. Among whites, 
57.9% had health benefits, compared to 53.8% for blacks, and just 43.5% for Hispanics. 
Coverage gaps by wage level, gender, and race were also large for pensions. Only 15.0% 
of the bottom fifth of workers had a pension plan at work, compared to 71.2% of the top 
fifth of workers. Again, men (47.2%) were more likely than women (43.5%), and whites 
(46.6%) were more likely than blacks (39.5%) and Hispanics (25.3%) to have an 
employer-provided pension. 
  The data in Table 2 also reveal important trends in benefit coverage over time. In 
the 1980s, both health and pension coverage rates fell across the board. For health 
insurance, the cutbacks generally hit the most disadvantaged groups (except women) 
hardest. Between 1979 and 1989, for example, overall health insurance coverage fell 7.5 
percentage points, but declined most for low-wage workers (down 11.5 percentage points 
for the bottom fifth of workers) and least for high-wage workers (down 4.8 percentage 
points). Declines were also steeper for Hispanics (down 14.4 percentage points) and 
blacks (down 6.8 percentage points) than they were for whites (down 6.3 percentage 
points). The fall-off in pension-plan participation over the same period, however, was 
more evenly shared. Between 1979 and 1989, pension coverage fell 6.9 percentage 
points, with declines about equal at the bottom and top of the wage distribution (both 
down 5.7 percentage points) and for whites (down 6.1 percentage points) and blacks 
  7(down 5.1 percentage points) --though the participation of Hispanics in pension plans fell 
11.8 percentage points. 
  In the 1990s, benefit-coverage rates stabilized in the case of health insurance (up  
1.9 percentage points between 1989 and 2000) and, in the case of pension plans, coverage 
even managed to recoup most of the ground lost in the 1980s (up 5.9 percentage points). 
With respect to health insurance, disadvantaged groups generally fared best in the 1990s. 
Coverage rates rose most for low-wage workers –up 7 percentage points among the 
bottom fifth, compared to a 3.5 percentage point decline for the highest fifth. For blacks, 
rates increased 3.9 percentage points, slightly faster than the corresponding 3.2 
percentage-point increase for whites (though Hispanics fell 1.2 percentage points). With 
respect to pensions, increases were slightly larger for low- and middle-wage workers than 
they were for high-wage workers; larger for women (up 8.0 percent points) than they 
were for men (up 4.2 percentage points); and much larger for whites (up 8.5 percentage 
points) than they were for blacks (up 2.4 percentage points) or Hispanics (up 2.2 
percentage points). 
  One important reason for the apparent improvements in pension coverage in the 
1990s was probably the large shift from "defined-benefit" to "defined-contribution" 
pension plans. In defined-benefit plans, which were by far the most common form of 
pension plans in the earlier postwar period, employers guaranteed workers a specific 
payment in retirement, generally based on the employee's salary history and time with the 
employer. Employers would set aside and invest a portion of each employee's total 
compensation and use those invested funds to pay the specified benefit in the employee's 
retirement. In defined-contribution plans, which have become more widespread since the 
late 1970s, employers contribute to a pension plan managed individually by each 
  8employee. Employees then use the proceeds from their individual accounts to provide for 
their own retirement. While defined-contribution plans give direct control to employees, 
these plans also shift all investment risk to employees.
6 The last row of Table 2 shows the 
share of employees participating in pension plans whose benefits were primarily in the 
form a defined-contribution program. The share rose from 16% in 1980 to 42% by the 
late 1990s, with fastest shift occurring in the 1980s. 
 Incomes 
  The second economic distribution of interest here is annual income –the money 
families receive in the course of a year from all sources including work, government 
transfers, profits from investments, and other sources. Table 3 provides a summary of the 
annual family income distribution in 2001, highlighting several important features. First, 
the income distribution is even more unequal than the wage distribution. A family in the 
80th percentile of the income distribution received almost four times more per year than a 
family in the 20th percentile of the distribution ($94,150 at the 80th percentile, compared 
to $24,000 at the 20th percentile). Thus, the gap between the 80th and the 20th 
percentiles in the income distribution is about the same size as the gap between the 90th 
and 10th percentiles in the wage distribution. Moreover, as was the case with the wage 
distribution, income inequality is especially exaggerated at the top. In 2001, a family in 
the 95th percentile of the income distribution, for example, made 3.2 times more than a 
family receiving the median income ($164,104, compared to $51,407). For wages in the 
same year, the 95th percentile was only 2.8 times higher than the median wage. 
                                                 
6 While many employees prefer direct control over their retirement savings, many others don't enjoy the 
corresponding administrative burden and added financial risk. The poor performance of US stock markets 
in 2000, 2001, and 2002 has heightened general awareness about risks inherent in defined-contribution 
pension plans. 
 
  9  A second feature of the income distribution is that racial differences are even 
starker than for wages. In 2001, black and Hispanic families in the middle of their 
respective annual-income distributions, for example, received less than two-thirds of the 
income going to a family in the middle of the white distribution (about $42,000 for both 
blacks and Hispanics, compared to about $65,000 for whites).
7 
  Figure 4 shows inflation-adjusted changes in the median family income from the 
end of World War II through 2004 (with the trend growth for 1947-1973 projected 
through 2003). Between 1947 and 1979, the real income of the median US family more 
than doubled. After 1973, the growth rate decelerated and family income began to 
demonstrate a strongly cyclical pattern, falling sharply in downturns (almost unheard of 
in the earlier postwar period) and rising in booms. Family income growth was 
particularly rapid in the extended economic expansion of the late 1990s. 
  The path of median family earnings in Figure 4, however, misses two important 
characteristics of recent trends in family income. The first is that even as growth in 
family earnings decelerated after the mid-1970s, the number of hours that families work 
(particularly married-couple families with children) has expanded greatly. The typical 
married-couple family with children, for example, as a family, worked almost 15 more 
weeks per year (about 18% longer) in 2000 than it did in 1979.
8 Much of the rise in 
family income that did take place after 1979, therefore, stemmed from family members 
working more in the course of a year. 
                                                 
7 Since most families include both males and females, a gender analysis of family income requires more 
sophisticated analysis than is possible here. A complete gender analysis would involve a review of patterns 
both across family types (for example, single-parent families, one-earner married-couple families, and two-
earner married-couple families) and within families, where gender may play an important role in the 
allocation of family resources. 
 
8 See Mishel, Bernstein, and Boushey (2003), Table 1.26. 
 
  10  The second feature missing from Figure 4 is the distribution of gains across the 
full distribution. Figure 5 illustrates that the experience of families at different points of 
the income distribution varied greatly before and after the mid-1970s. Between 1947 and 
1973, the annual growth rate in family income was high and fairly uniform across the 
income distribution. If anything, families at the bottom and middle saw their incomes rise 
slightly faster than families at the top. From 1973 through 2003, however, growth rates 
were much slower across the board and particularly bad at the bottom and middle. In the 
first part of the postwar period, income growth was rapid and generally equalizing; from 
the mid-1980s, growth has, on average, been slow and skewed toward the top. 
  Wealth 
The third economic distribution of interest here is the distribution of wealth –the 
net value of each household's assets (such as housing, stocks and bonds, savings 
accounts, etc.) minus its debts (mortgages, credit-card debts, car loans, etc.). Table 4 
demonstrates that the distribution of wealth is, by far, the most unequal of the three 
distributions analyzed here. In 2001, the wealthiest one percent of households controlled 
33.4% of the wealth, an amount equal to about 100 times the 0.3% share of all wealth 
held by the least wealthy 40% of households (see panel (a)). The differences in net wealth 
are particularly striking when expressed in dollar terms (see panel (b)). The average 
wealth holdings of the poorest 40% of households was just $2,900, compared to $75,000 
(primarily housing) for the middle 20% of households, and $12.7 million for the top 1%.  
During the stock-market bubble of the late 1990s, one form of wealth –stock 
ownership– became the focus of substantial media and political attention. Table 4 shows 
that, for all but the wealthiest families, stock market wealth actually did not represent a 
particularly important vehicle for wealth accumulation. The bottom 40% of households, 
  11for example, held, on average, only about $1,800 in stock in all forms, compared to about 
$12,000 for households in the middle and $3.6 million for households at the very top. 
Consistent with the pattern observed for wages and incomes, wealth holding 
differs enormously across racial lines. In 1998, for example, the median black household 
had a net wealth that was equal to just 11% of the net wealth for the median white family. 




Power, Politics, and Inequality 
  The preceding section documented the high –and generally rising– levels of 
inequality in three key economic distributions. To a large extent, changes across these 
three distributions are linked. Declining wages lowered incomes except where 
households increased their number of hours of paid work (a fairly widespread 
phenomenon among married-couple families). Stagnating and declining incomes, in turn, 
made it more difficult for households to save and, thus, to accumulate wealth, which 
exacerbated already high levels of wealth inequality. This section attempts to sketch 
briefly the principal economic and political forces that lie behind these recent, 
interrelated, changes in the distribution of wages, income, and wealth. While the separate 
forces identified take many forms, a common thread runs through all of them: each 
represents a shift in bargaining power away from workers and toward their employers. In 
the global North, these policies are associated with the political and economic legacy of 
Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and related "supply-side" and "free-market" 
                                                 
9 See Wolff (2004), Table 8. 
 
  12politicians and economists. In the global South, a similar constellation of policies has 
been labeled the "Washington Consensus" and is often referred to as "neo-liberalism." 
  Decline of unions 
  The most obvious decline in workers' bargaining power over the period was the 
steep drop in unionization rates. Between 1979 and 2004, the share of workers who were 
members of unions or who were covered by collective-bargaining agreements fell from 
just under 25% to less than 13% of all workers (see Figure 6). The associated reduction in 
bargaining power made an important contribution to rising wage inequality, especially for 
men (see, for example, Card, 1992; Freeman, 1993; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; 
Gosling and Lemieux 2001). 
  Falling minimum wage 
  Between 1979 and 1990, the inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage fell 
about 30% (see Figure 7). After almost a decade without an increase in the nominal value 
of the minimum wage, Congress set increases in the federal minimum wage four times in 
the 1990s (1990, 1991, 1996, and 1997). Since 1997, however, the minimum wage has 
remained at $5.15 per hour, setting off a new round of declining purchasing power. The 
long-term decline in the bite of the minimum wage effectively has undermined the 
bargaining power of low-wage workers (especially low-wage women, whose wages 
closely track the minimum wage) and, thereby, has contributed in an important way to 
rising wage inequality over the last two decades (see, for example, Card and Krueger, 
1995; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; and Lee, 1999).  
  Restrictive macroeconomic policy 
  Many formal models of the labor market emphasize the important role that the 
unemployment rate plays in determining workers' bargaining power in wage negotiations 
  13(see, for example, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991, among many). When 
unemployment rates are low, workers can press for better wages, benefits, and working 
conditions because they realize that even if they lose their jobs in the process, finding 
new jobs will not be difficult. When unemployment rates are high, however, incumbent 
workers who demand too much may find themselves out of work in a labor market where 
their other opportunities are limited. For many of the last 25 years, macroeconomic 
policy kept the unemployment rate high by historical standards. These high levels of 
unemployment from the early 1980s through the mid-1990s lowered workers' bargaining 
power and helped to drive down real wages.
10 Only after 1995, when the unemployment 
rate fell below 6%, eventually reaching and maintaining a rate of 4%, did wages start to 
rise in real terms for low- and middle-wage workers. Real wages have stagnated again 
since the downturn of the early 2000s. 
  Globalization 
  Over the last two decades, conscious actions to open up US markets to the rest of 
the world have forced US workers to confront increasing competition from workers in 
other countries.
11 While trade can –under the right circumstances– improve economic 
efficiency and increase the domestic standard of living, rising international competition 
can also reduce employment opportunities and wages for national workers. The net effect 
of these two opposing forces –rising real incomes stemming from efficiency gains 
through trade, and declining real income as a result of increased competition for jobs and 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of the economic benefits of low unemployment for workers, see Bernstein and Baker, 
2003. 
 
11 US markets have opened up considerably since the late 1970s, though some important tariff and non-
tariff barriers remain. The United States also continues to subsidize an important portion of its agricultural 
exports. For a critique of protectionist measures by the United States and other rich countries, see Oxfam, 
2002, and references therein. For an analysis that suggests the limits of trade liberalization as a path toward 
economic development in the global South, see Weisbrot and Baker, 2002. 
 
  14wages– depends crucially on national economic and social institutions.
12 In the United 
States, which starts with high levels of inequality and has only weak redistributive 
mechanisms, the process of globalization –as implemented so far– has generally acted to 
lower wages in both manufacturing (through inflows of traded goods, outflows of capital, 
a rise in "outsourcing," and corporate relocation threats) and in some services (some of 





  Wage, income, and wealth inequality in the United States have always been high, 
but all three forms of economic inequality have grown worse since the end of the 1970s. 
Wages are not just more unequal. Between 1979 and 2004, wages for workers at the 
middle and bottom of the wage distribution only just kept pace with inflation –over a 
period when the output per hour of the average workers grew by over 66% in real terms. 
Over the last 25 years, incomes across most of the distribution have grown more slowly 
than they did in the earlier postwar period, with rising annual hours worked playing an 
important role in what real gains families did experience. The distribution of wealth has 
                                                 
12 For an analysis of trade liberalization and social policy, see Rodrik, 1997. 
 
13 For a review of the various channels through which globalization may affect national wage and 
employment levels, see Schmitt, 1999. For a discussion of the use of relocation threats in the context of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, see Bronfenbrenner, 1997. 
 
14 The short discussion here cannot analyze the impact of changes in the current model of globalization on 
workers in other rich countries or in developing economies. That competition from foreign workers can 
reduce domestic workers' wages or employment opportunities –in and of itself– has no moral or policy 
implications. At one level, the same processes discussed here work in the other direction as well, with 
competition from US workers, all else constant, reducing wages and employment in the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors in many developing economies (while any related efficiency gains may act 
simultaneously to raise living standards in these same receiving countries). At a deeper level, though, the 
way we carry out economic integration, including decisions about inter- and intra-national mechanisms for 
redistribution of both current income and any efficiency gains from trade constitutes the real moral 
questions posed by globalization.  
  15become more skewed toward the very top, with "stock-holder democracy" having little 
impact on the actual distribution of national wealth. In all cases, these economic divisions 
are especially sharp across gender and racial lines. 
  The well-documented decline in union representation, the falling real value of the 
minimum wage, nearly two decades of restrictive macroeconomic policy, and a forced 
opening up of much of the US economy to competition from the rest of the world can 
explain much of the recent rise in economic inequality. These key developments all took 
place along side a widespread move toward economic deregulation, the privatization of 
government services (especially at the state and local level), and cutbacks in the social 
safety net (best exemplified in the wholesale restructuring in 1996 of the "welfare" 
system supporting poor mothers of young children).
15 Separately –but especially in 
combination– all these forces had, by the turn of the century, greatly reduced workers' 
bargaining power relative to where conditions stood at the end of the 1970s. While each 
of these forces bear directly or indirectly on negotiations between workers and employers 
over wages, benefits, and working conditions, all of these forces had their origin in 
broader shifts in political power: changes in the legal environment facing unions; 
legislative decisions about the level of the federal minimum wage; central bank decisions 
about interest rates; the federal government's attitude toward industry regulation; and 
public opinion about issues as diverse as the efficiency of markets and the desirability of 
maintaining a social safety net for those experiencing short- and long-term economic 
difficulties. Only changes in economic policies will undo the economic inequality 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
15 In the United States, at least, the impact of deregulation, privatization, and the declining social safety net 
on wage and income inequality is not as well studied as the links between unionization, the minimum wage, 
restrictive macroeconomic policy, and globalization. For a discussion of the impact of deregulation on 
wage inequality, see Peoples, 1998. For a discussion of the impact of deterioration in the safety net, see the 
  16generated over the last two decades or so, but only changes in politics ("who gets what") 




                                                                                                                                                 
chapter on wages in Mishel, Bernstein, and Boushey, 2003, and earlier editions of The State of Working 
America. 
 
16 This account gives little attention to the possible role of technological change in explaining rising 
economic inequality. The conventional story is that the recent rise in economic inequality principally 
reflects rising economic returns to skills: those with the appropriate skills fare well in the "new economy," 
which creates an ever-widening gap with respect to those who lack the necessary skills to thrive in the "new 
economy." But, technological change has been a constant in the US economy since at least the industrial 
revolution, and such change has almost always been, on net, "skill-biased." What is different about the last 
two decades or so is that the economic institutions that previously ensured equal (and, sometimes, 
equalizing) growth –even in the face of skill-biased technological growth– no longer seem to have been 
operating. For a skeptical review of the economic evidence in favor of the skill-biased technological change 
explanation of rising inequality, see Bernstein and Mishel, 2001, and Card and DiNardo, 2002. 
  17References 
 
Bernstein, Jared and Dean Baker. 2003. The Benefits of Full Employment. Washington, 
DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
 
Bernstein, Jared and Lawrence Mishel. 2001. "Seven Reasons for Skepticism about the 
Technology Story of U.S. Wage Inequality," in Ivar Berg and Arne L. Kalleberg 
(eds.), Sourcebook of Labor Markets: Evolving Structures and Processes. New 
York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 1997. The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat of Plant Closing on 
the Right of Workers to Organize. Dallas, Texas: North American Commission 
for Labor Cooperation.  
 
Burniaux, Jean-Marc, Thai-Thanh Dang, Douglas Fore, Michael Förster, Marco Mira 
d'Ercole, and Howard Oxley. 1998. "Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected 
OECD Countries." Economics Department Working Paper No. 189. Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
 
Card, David. 1992. "The Effect of Unions on the Distribution of Wages: Redistribution or 
Relabelling?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4195. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: NBER. 
 
Card, David and John DiNardo. 2002. "Skill-biased Technological Change and Rising 
Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles." National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper No. 8769. Cambridge, Massachusetts: NBER. 
 
Card, David and Alan Krueger. 1995. Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of 
the Minimum Wage. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
DiNardo, John, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. "Labor Market Institutions 
and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semi-Parametric Approach," 
Econometrica, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 1001-1044. 
 
Freeman, Richard. 1993. "How Much Has De-unionization Contributed to the Rise in 
Male Earnings Inequality?" in Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk (eds.), 
Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
 
Glyn, Andrew. 2001. "Inequalities of employment and wages in OECD countries," 
unpublished paper, University of Oxford.  
 
Gosling, Amanda and Thomas Lemieux. 2001. "Labour Market Reforms and Changes in 
Wage Inequality in the United Kingdom and the United States." National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8413. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
NBER. 
 
  18Layard, Richard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman. 1991. Unemployment: 
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lee, David S. 1999. "Wage Inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rising 
Dispersion or Falling Minimum Wage?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
114, no. 3, pp. 977-1023. 
 
Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. 2003. The State of Working 
America 2002-2003. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Allegretto. 2005. The State of Working 
America 2002-2003. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Oxfam. 2002. "Boxing Match in International Trade," Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 32.   
<http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp021119_agricultural_trade.pdf> 
 
Peoples, James. 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 111-130. 
 
Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics. 
 
Schmitt, John. 1999. "Globalization and Labor Markets: A View from the United States," 
in Carl Lankowski (ed.), Responses to Globalization in Germany and the United 
States: Seven Sectors Compared, American Institute for Contemporary German 
Studies Research Report No. 10, Washington, DC: AICGS. 
 
Schmitt, John. 2001. "Did Job Quality Deteriorate in the 1980s and 1990s?" in Ivar Berg 
and Arne L. Kalleberg (eds.), Sourcebook of Labor Markets: Evolving Structures 
and Processes. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
 
Schmitt, John and Lawrence Mishel. 2000. "The United States and Europe: Who's Really 
Ahead?" in Jeff Madrick (ed.) Unconventional Wisdom: Alternative Perspectives 
on the New Economy. New York: The Century Foundation Press. 
 
Smeeding, Timothy M. 2002. "Globalization, Inequality and the Rich Countries of the G-
20: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)." Luxembourg Income 
Study Working Paper No. 320. <http://www.lisproject.org/publications/ 
liswps/320.pdf> 
 
Wolff, Edward. 2000. "Why Stocks Won't Save the Middle Class" in Jeff Madrick (ed.) 
Unconventional Wisdom: Alternative Perspectives on the New Economy. New 
York: The Century Foundation Press.  
 
Wolff, Edward. 2004. "Changes in Household Wealth in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
U.S.," The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 407. 
 
  19Weisbrot, Mark and Dean Baker. 2002. "The Relative Impact of Trade Liberalization on 
Developing Countries." Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy 
Research.
  20 
 
TABLE 1      
Hourly wage distribution, by race and gender, 2004 
(2003  dollars)      
              
 Percentile 
   10  50  90  95 
     
All 6.80  14.00  30.46  37.34 
     
   White  7.28  14.94  32.39  38.74 
   Black  6.80  12.14  25.28  31.11 
   Hispanic  6.55  10.62  23.30  28.45 
     
Women 6.80  12.45  27.18  33.61 
     
   White  6.80  13.11  28.01  34.31 
   Black  6.36  11.65  24.27  29.13 
   Hispanic  6.07  9.71  21.51  26.77 
     
Men 7.28  15.53  33.61  40.05 
     
   White  7.77  17.26  35.27  42.01 
   Black  7.01  12.91  26.89  33.61 
   Hispanic  6.80  11.09  24.27  29.56 
              
Source: Analysis of CEPR CPS ORG extract, version 0.96. The white and black 
categories exclude those of Hispanic origin; Hispanics may be of any race. 
 
 
  21TABLE 2 
Health and pension benefit coverage rates, 1979-2002 
(Percent) 
                       
        Percentage-point  change 
    1979 1989 2000 2002     1979-1989  1989-2002 
(a)  Health  care  plans           
           
All  workers  69.0 61.5 63.4  57.3   -7.5 -4.2 
  Men  75.4  66.8  66.6  61.1   -8.6 -5.7 
    Women  59.4 54.9 59.3  52.8   -4.5 -2.1 
            
White  70.3 64.0 67.2  57.9   -6.3 -6.1 
Black  63.1 56.3 60.2  53.8   -6.8 -2.5 
Hispanic  60.4 46.0 44.8 43.5   -14.4  -2.5 
            
By wage quintile               
  Lowest  37.9  26.4  33.4  26.6    -11.5  0.2 
  Second  60.5  51.7  57.7  48.8   -8.8 -2.9 
  Middle  74.7  67.5  68.3  62.7   -7.2 -4.8 
  Fourth  83.5  78.0  77.0  72.1   -5.5 -5.9 
  Top  89.5  84.7  81.2  78.5   -4.8 -6.2 
            
(b) Pension plans               
            
All  workers  50.6 43.7 49.6 45.5   -6.9  1.8 
  Men  56.9  46.9  51.1  47.2    -10.0  0.3 
    Women  41.3 39.6 47.6 43.5   -1.7  3.9 
            
White  52.2 46.1 54.6 46.6   -6.1  0.5 
Black  45.8 40.7 43.1  39.5   -5.1 -1.2 
Hispanic  38.2 26.3 28.5 25.3   -11.9  -1.0 
            
By wage quintile               
  Lowest  18.4  12.7  16.0 15.0   -5.7  2.3 
  Second  36.8  29.0  34.4 33.3   -7.8  4.3 
  Middle  52.3  44.5  49.9 48.4   -7.8  3.9 
  Fourth  68.4  60.0  63.6 61.9   -8.4  1.9 
  Top  78.5  72.8  73.0  71.2   -5.7 -1.6 
            
Defined  contrib.  plans  16.0 38.0 42.0 42.0      22.0  4.0 
Notes: Coverage defined as being in an employer-provided plan where the employer paid 
at least part of the coverage. EPI analysis of wage and salary workers, ages 16 to 64, who 
worked at least 20 hours per week and 26 weeks per year, using March CPS data; adapted 
from Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegreto (2005), Tables 2.14 and 2.15. Share of pension 
participants primarily in defined-contribution plans from Employment Benefit Research 
Institute (1998), Table 4; data on defined-contribution plans in column one refer to 1980; 
column two, to 1990; columns three and four, to 1997, with corresponding changes in last two 
columns. 
  22 
 
TABLE 3 
Annual family income distribution, by race, 2001 
(Upper limits for each income group, in 2001 US dollars) 
                 
       Lower 
 Lowest  Second  Middle  Fourth  Limit of 
   Fifth  Fifth Fifth Fifth Top 5% 
All 24,000  41,127  62,500  94,150  164,104 
        
White 26,000  44,000  65,283  97,185  169,501 
Black 14,256  26,350  42,400  67,523  110,977 
Hispanic 16,000  28,000  41,600  66,040  113,374 
                 
Notes: Author's analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, 
Families, Tables F-1, F1-A, F1-B, and F1-C. White families exclude those of 
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TABLE 4        
Distribution of wealth, 1962-2001       
( p e r c e n t )         
                    
  Bottom  Middle Next Next Next  Top 
    40% 20% 20% 10%  9%  1% 
(a) Share of all wealth        
1962  0.3  5.4 13.4 14.0 33.7 33.4 
1983  0.9  5.2 12.6 13.1 34.4 33.8 
1989  -0.7  4.8 12.3 13.0 33.2 37.4 
1998  0.2  4.5 11.9 12.5 32.8 38.1 
2001  0.3  3.9 11.3 12.9 38.1 33.4 
        
(b) Average dollar value, 2001 (thousands 2001 US dollars)     
    Stocks  1.8  12.0  41.3  131.9  512.3  3,568.4 
+ All other assets  26.6  113.5  234.6  438.4  1,221.1  9,449.5 
-  Total debt  25.5  50.5  60.5  79.9  122.3  325.8 
    Net wealth  2.9  75.0 215.3 490.3  1,611.0  12,692.1 
                    
Notes: Analysis of Survey of Consumer Finance data by Edward Wolff (2004), reproduced in 
Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegreto (2005), Tables 4.3 and 4.9. Stocks include all direct and indirect  
holdings such as mutual funds and 401(k) retirement plans. Net wealth is the sum of stocks and  
all other assets, minus total debt.           
 
























  Source: Analysis of CEPR CPS ORG extract (1979-04) chained to EPI May CPS extract  
  (1973-79), deflated using CPI-U-RS.
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urce: Analysis of Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; deflated using CPI-U-RS. 
 
Figure 5: Annual growth rate in real family income, 1947-2003 
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Source: Analysis of Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; deflated using CPI-U-RS.














Source: Analysis of BLS employment data and unionization data from  the Labor Research Association. 
 













  Source: Author's analysis  of US Department of Labor, "Federal minimum wage rates 
under the FLSA," http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.pdf. 
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